Florida Statutes Section 63.172, titled “Effect of judgment of adoption,” provides in part:
A judgment of adoption, whether entered by a court of this state, another state, or of any other place, has the following effect: … It terminates all legal relationships between the adopted person and the adopted person’s relatives, including the birth parents, except a birth parent who is a petitioner or who is married to a petitioner, so that the adopted person thereafter is a stranger to his or her former relatives for all purposes, including the interpretation or construction of documents, statutes, and instruments, whether executed before or after entry of the adoption judgment, that do not expressly include the adopted person by name or by some designation not based on a parent and child or blood relationship, except that rights of inheritance shall be as provided in the Florida Probate Code.
In Leonard v. Crocker, 661 So. 2d 1244, 1245 (3d DCA 1995), the decedent’s daughter was identified as the beneficiary of his individual retirement account (IRA). The beneficiary designation specifically identified the daughter by name, date of birth, the nature of the relationship, and social security number. The personal representative of the decedent's estate sought to recover the proceeds of the decedent's IRA on the theory that the beneficiary designation of the IRA could not be carried out because the decedent’s daughter was adopted subsequent to the creation of the IRA and thus, the adoption converted her into a legally different person than the person described in the beneficiary designation.
Even though the decedent’s daughter was later adopted by her stepfather after her mother remarried (and had since changed her last name), the Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision that the decedent’s adopted daughter was entitled to the proceeds of the IRA. According to the appellate court:
Section 63.172, Florida Statutes (1993), provides a judgment of adoption "…terminates all legal relationships between the adopted person and his relatives, including his birth parents [subject to an exception not relevant to this case], so that the adopted person thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives for all purposes, including inheritance and the interpretation or construction of documents, statutes, and instruments, whether executed before or after entry of the adoption judgment, that do not expressly include the adopted person by name or by some designation not based on a parent and child or blood relationship." (emphasis added).
In the instant case, the decedent expressly designated the adopted person [Sara Elizabeth Crocker] as the beneficiary of his IRA account -- namely, by birth date and social security number. It is undisputed that Sara Elizabeth Crocker has the same birth date and social security number as that designated by the decedent as the primary beneficiary of the IRA account. We agree that if the subject beneficiary had merely been designated, without more, as the "daughter" of the decedent under the name "Sara Elizabeth Leonard," the proceeds of the account would have lapsed as the decedent legally had no such daughter at the time of his death. The fact remains, however, that the decedent described the beneficiary of the IRA account by birth date and social security number, and thereby expressly designated the person who is now named Sara Elizabeth Crocker. Upon the death of the decedent, the undistributed proceeds of the IRA account were properly awarded by the trial court to Sara Elizabeth Crocker. See Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 1956)(Totten trust account); Lopez v. Rodriguez, 574 So. 2d 249, 250 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)(same); Euart v. Yoakley, 456 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)(inter vivos trust).
Joel Ewusiak represents beneficiaries in disputes concerning entitlement to the proceeds of IRAs and life insurance policies. Please contact Joel for legal assistance with your specific matter.