Under Florida’s “Slayer” Statute:
A named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy, or other contractual arrangement who unlawfully and intentionally kills the principal obligee or the person upon whose life the policy is issued is not entitled to any benefit under the bond, policy, or other contractual arrangement; and it becomes payable as though the killer had predeceased the decedent.
Fla. Stat. § 732.802(3) (2019).
In 1982, the legislature expanded § 732.802 to prevent a killer from obtaining property or interests outside of the decedent’s estate through intestacy or his will, such as life insurance policies. Cosman v. Rodriguez, 153 So. 3d 371, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Inc. v. Baitinger, 452 So.2d 140, 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). The 1982 amendments to the statute were added “clearly illustrat[ing] the legislative intent to broaden the scope of the statute as far as possible so that courts would no longer have to rely solely on equitable principles to prevent a killer from profiting from his action.” Prudential, 452 So.2d at 142 n.3 (noting that § 732.802(3) adopts the equitable standard and procedure of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Carter v. Carter, 88 So. 2d 153, 157 (Fla. 1956)). The legislative history of the 1982 amendments “clearly illustrates that the legislature intended to make it more difficult for a killer to receive any beneficial interest as a result of his [or her] wrongdoing.” Id. at 142 n.5.
The equitable principle, or “slayer rule,” underlying statutes such as § 732.802 is that “a person who, without legal excuse or justification, is responsible for the felonious and intentional killing of the decedent” is “denied any right to benefit from the wrong” under civil law. Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills & Don. Trans.) § 8.4 (2003); accord 4 Couch on Insurance, Rule of Exclusion § 62:1 (3d ed. 2019) (“A beneficiary who unlawfully kills the insured is generally barred from receiving the proceeds of insurance, on the theory that it is contrary to public policy to permit a person who has unlawfully killed another to recover on a policy covering the life of the deceased, thus profiting by his or her own wrong.”). In the century-old and oft-quoted case of Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 877, 29 L.Ed. 997 (1886), the United States Supreme Court held that if a person who would benefit from an insurance policy based on the life of another, payable at his death, murdered the insured to make the policy payable, he could not recover on the policy:
Independently of any proof of the motives of [the murderer] in obtaining the policy, and even assuming that they were just and proper, he forfeited all rights under it when, to secure its immediate payment, he murdered the assured. It would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country if one could recover insurance money payable on the death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken. As well might he recover insurance money upon a building that he had willfully fired.
Id. at 599-600.
In relying on the United States Supreme Court’s Armstrong decision, the Florida Supreme Court described the principle as “an axiom of the common law, supported by admirable concepts of common justice, that no person should be permitted to benefit from his own wrong. It is offensive to our sense of right that a wrongdoer be allowed to exploit his wrongs to the injury of another and to the profit of himself.” Carter v. Carter, 88 So. 2d 153, 157 (Fla. 1956); Hamilton v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 207 So.2d 472, 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968) (citing Carter in affirming state trial court’s decision to set up a common fund from proceeds of insurance policy for benefit of children of decedent under supervisory proceedings in county court because his spouse, named as primary beneficiary, had unlawfully and feloniously killed the insured during domestic squabble and was not entitled to receive proceeds of policy). The Florida Supreme Court further noted:
This court has repeatedly held that where the beneficiary in a policy of life insurance wrongfully kills the insured, public policy prohibits a recovery by the beneficiary. . . . The willful, unlawful, and felonious killing of the [insured] by the person named as beneficiary in a life policy forfeits all rights of such person therein. It is unnecessary that there should be an express exception in the contract of insurance forbidding a recovery in favor of such person in such event. On considerations of public policy the death of the insured intentionally caused by the beneficiary of the policy is an excepted risk so far as the person thus causing the death is concerned. . . . The courts appear to be practically unanimous in the holding that in the absence of a contrary statute, a beneficiary who unlawfully and intentionally takes the life on the insured thereby disqualifies himself to receive the proceeds of the insurance policy.
Carter, 88 So.2d at 157-58 (quotations and citations omitted) (holding that if the wife of the insured is shown on remand to have unlawfully and intentionally killed him by a preponderance of the evidence—even though acquitted in the criminal case—then the insurance proceeds would pass to the beneficiary next in priority). The general “rationale for the slayer rule is the prevention of unjust enrichment”; thus, “[a]ny enrichment accruing to a slayer from the wrong is unjust and . . . [t]he slayer’s motive in committing the wrong is irrelevant. Application of the slayer rule does not depend on a showing that the motive for the slaying was to obtain a financial benefit.” Restatement § 8.4.
The underlying principle is well-established and has been universally applied. “A widow should not, for the purpose of acquiring . . . property rights, be permitted to allege a widowhood which she has . . . . intentionally created.” Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190–91 (N.Y. 1889); accord, e.g., Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Maag, 285 F.2d 558, 560 (10th Cir. 1960) (murderer may not recover on the victim’s life insurance policy, and the contingent beneficiaries should receive the policy proceeds); Harper v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 233 Kan. 358, 662 P.2d 1264, 1271 (1983) (noting the “almost universally followed” common law rule that bars the “beneficiary of a life insurance policy who feloniously kills the insured from recovering under the policy whether convicted or not”); Jones v. All American Life Ins. Co., 316 S.E.2d 122, 125 (1984) (holding the common law bars killers from receiving their victims’ insurance policy proceeds), aff’d, 325 S.E.2d 237 (N.C. 1985); Shrader v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 485 N.E.2d 1031, 1034–35 (Ohio 1985) (“the common law bars a beneficiary of a life insurance policy from receiving the proceeds of that policy when the beneficiary intentionally and feloniously caused the death of the insured,” regardless of whether the killer was convicted); McClure v. McClure, 403 S.E. 2d 197, 200-01 (1991) (describing the common law as holding that the “unlawful intentional causation of the death of an insured by the beneficiary named in the insurance policy, whether felonious or not, is the test of the common-law rule barring the beneficiary from the proceeds of the policy”) (quotation omitted); Annotation, Killing of Insured By Beneficiary As Affecting Life Insurance or Its Proceeds, 27 A.L.R.3d § II(A)(3), at 802–07 (1969 & 1994 Supp.).
Joel Ewusiak represents beneficiaries of life insurance policies who are seeking their rightful share of proceeds and named as defendants in a Complaint for Interpleader. Please contact Joel for legal assistance with your specific dispute.